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DISABILITY, THE END OF LIFE, AND WHY THE CONVERSATION IS STILL SO DIFFICULT
I. INTRODUCTION
 In the weeks prior to the symposium on which this volume of the New York Law 
School Law Review is based,1 the disability-rights group Not Dead Yet declared on its 
blog that the symposium was a “farce” that showed “ just how little respect and regard 
[the symposium organizers] have for people with disabilities.”2 The post took special 
issue with the third panel of the symposium, of which I was a participant.3 It claimed, 
1. New York Law School Law Review Symposium, Freedom of Choice at the End of Life: Patients’ Rights in a 
Shifting Legal and Political Landscape (Nov. 16, 2012). Video recordings of the symposium are available 
at http://www.nylslawreview.com/freedom-of-choice-at-the-end-of-life-videos/.
2. Stephen Drake, NY Law School—Justice Action Center’s Upcoming Annual Justice Symposium Not Fair to 
Disability Advocates, Let Alone “Just”, Not Dead Yet (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.notdeadyet.
org/2012/10/ny-law-school-justice-action-centers-upcoming-annual-justice-symposium-not-fair-to-
disability-advocates-let-alone-just.html.
3. The post reads in part:
[T]here are multiple and major problems with the third panel of the Symposium. Here’s 
the title and description of that section:
Panel III: Special People, Special Issues
This panel will discuss the issues of concern for people with disabilities 
and the conflict between organizations dedicated to protecting their 
rights and end-of-life advocates. The panel will discuss the views of 
some of the major religion (sic) and whether conservative theological 
values can co-exist with patient choice. Finally, the panel will conclude 
with a discussion of the quality of medical care provided to prisoners 
and how their end of life choices are treated.
 The title about “special” people should alert readers immediately that there will be 
no disability advocates or activists describing our conflict(s) with so-called “end of life” 
advocates. Most of us roll our eyes, make gagging noises or give other subtle cues that 
we detest the “special” label when someone uses it around us. This session, btw, is 
moderated by yet another board member of Compassion and Choices.
 I would bet that the lion’s share of the load in terms of “discussing” the “issues of 
concern” that disability activists and advocates have will be the job of panelist Alicia 
Ouellette. Ouellette recently published a text on bioethics and disability—apparently 
becoming the newest bioethicist who wants to become known as the “disability-
conscious” bioethicist—someone who can relate slanted, distorted and outright ‘straw 
man’ versions of disability critiques, concerns and strong objections to both bioethics 
and so-called ‘end of life’ advocates. (I’m not linking to her book—I hear it’s not selling 
well and it would be nice if it continued on that path.) Suffice it to say, Ouellette gets 
many things wrong about disability issues in her book—especially when it comes to 
NDY-related issues. Small wonder—she didn’t reach out to anyone we know of (in 
checking her preface) in disability advocacy who was actually involved in cases she talks 
about in her book—Elizabeth Bouvia, Larry McAfee and Terri Schiavo to name a few.
 . . . . 
 That’s the kind of respect we “special” people can expect from this session.
 What makes it all the more appalling is that this will happen under the auspices of 
the University’s Justice Action Center. The Center describes its goals, in part, this way:
. . . the Center seeks to instill in students a deeper intellectual 
understanding of the law regardless of their final career goals, and to 
present opportunities to maintain their ties to the social justice 
community beyond law school. Recognizing that students will pursue 
varied careers, the Center aims to provide a framework for analyzing 
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among other things, that the panel demeaned people with disabilities by virtue of its 
title (“Special People, Special Issues”) and its composition (by including Ann 
Neumann4 and me, but no members of Not Dead Yet or similar disability-rights 
groups). According to the post, the symposium’s sponsors had denied disability 
advocates “even a modicum of respect in making sure the perspectives of disability 
advocates and activists are represented fairly and accurately.”5 “It’s a shame to see so 
many organizations join them in their total disdain for disability activists and 
advocates,” the post stated.6 At the event itself, a small group from Not Dead Yet 
protested outside the conference hall. They displayed signs and distributed handouts 
that repeated the charge that symposium organizers had shown contempt for persons 
with disabilities through the content of the presentations.7
 Regardless of the merits of the charges made by the disability activists,8 the 
presence of disability-rights protesters during an academic conference is noteworthy. 
However, such protests are not new. Indeed, forty protesters from Not Dead Yet took 
the pervasive questions and contradictions relating to social justice in 
American society, irrespective of the context in which they may arise.
 The main “contradiction” attendees will see at this symposium is the Justice 
Action Center’s failure to show even a modicum of respect in making sure the 
perspectives of disability advocates and activists are represented fairly and accurately. 
Do I have to add that ‘ justice” [sic] would mean having disability activists themselves 
speaking for ourselves?
 Shame on the Justice Action Center for showing everyone just how little respect 
and regard they have for people with disabilities.
 Shame on the sponsors of this farce—the New York Law School Law Review and 
the Diane Abbey Law Center for Children and Families, the American Bar Association 
Commission on Law and Aging; the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys; the 
Elder Law Section of the New York State Bar Association; and Collaborative for 
Palliative Care, Westchester/NYS Southern Region.
 Id. (quoting description of Panel III at the New York Law School Law Review symposium Freedom of 
Choice at the End of Life: Patients’ Rights in a Shifting Legal and Political Landscape, available at http://
www.nylslawreview.com/freedom-of-choice-at-the-end-of-life/); see also Justice Action Center, N.Y.L. 
Sch., http://www.nyls.edu/justice-action-center/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
4. Ann Neumann is a hospice volunteer, and has written for Guernica, the Nation, AlterNet, and other 
publications. She edits the Revealer, a publication of the Center for Religion and Media at New York 
University, and teaches journalism at Drew University.
5. Drake, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. See Stephen Drake, NDY Activists Leaflet Justice Action Center (NY Law School) Featuring Opponents 
Discussing “Disability Concerns” Without Including Disability Rights Activists to Speak for Ourselves, Not 
Dead Yet (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.notdeadyet.org/2012/11/ndy-activists-leaf let-justice-action-
center-ny-law-school-featuring-opponents-discussing-disability-concerns-without-including-
disability-rights-activists-to-speak-for-ourselves.html.
8. As I understand it, New York Law School did reach out to disability-rights advocates to participate in 
the symposium, but those invitations were declined. In addition, the panel included two presentations 
on inmates and one on disability, which might explain the moniker.
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over a plenary session of one of the first national conferences I helped to organize.9 The 
Not Dead Yet blog was also deeply critical of a conference that I organized to engage 
disability activists in a conversation about a range of bioethical issues.10 Disability 
activists are not alone in contesting discussions favoring choice in dying—some 
disability scholars also contend that arguments favoring choice in dying are necessarily 
harmful to persons with disabilities.11 The protests are noteworthy nonetheless because 
they reveal a deep-seated disconnect between two groups: advocates for choice in dying 
and disability-rights activists. Both groups purport to share a commitment to respect 
for all individuals, but disability-rights activists argue that advocates for choice in dying 
threaten the rights of people with disabilities as individuals.12
 This essay seeks to explain the context that gives rise to this disconnect. My 
point here is not to debate the merits of the arguments made in opposition to choice-
in-dying laws. Others have done that.13 My objective is to share what I have learned 
9. See Not Dead Yet!, Ctr. for Disability Rts. (July 13, 2006), http://cdrnys.org/images/oldcdr/20060714ndy.
html.
10. The post stated:
 Give me a break. First of all, there have been several single-shot events by 
different entities over the years that accomplished nothing—except perhaps for the 
bioethicists who sponsored the events to pat themselves on the back for their one-time 
exercise in inclusion. And, having done that, return to exclusion as a matter of standard 
operating procedure.
 . . . .
 The reality is that this “discourse” around bioethics is more than just an exchange 
of philosophies, ideas, and experiences. At the core, this is a political struggle over 
public policy—a struggle between those who have power and seek to hold onto it and 
those directly affected by the policies who want to take power, [sic]
 And no one knows it better than the bioethicists who are hosting this event.
 Stephen Drake, Disability and Ethics Conference this Weekend—Low Expectations Based on Past 
Performance, Not Dead Yet (May 19, 2010), http://www.notdeadyet.org/2010/05/disability-and-
ethics-conference-this.html.
11. See generally John B. Mitchell, Understanding Assisted Suicide: Nine Issues to Consider 
57–104 (2007) (discussing the complex issues of assisted suicide through nine contexts). See, e.g., 
Christopher Newell, Disability, Bioethics, and Rejected Knowledge, 31 J. Med. & Phil. 269, 275 (2006) 
(charging that bioethics is a disabling project); Diane Coleman & Tom Nerney, Guardianship and 
the Disability Rights Movement 1, available at http://www.centerforself-determination.com/docs/
guard/GuardianshipDisabilityRightsColemanNerney1.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (“[The] powerful 
field of bioethics represents the single greatest threat to the welfare of those with significant disabilities 
in this country. Under the rubric of utilitarian ethics and the language of rights, discrimination against 
people with disabilities has become enshrined in law and popular imagination.”).
12. The claim is that “legalized medical killing is really about a deadly double standard for people with 
severe disabilities, including both conditions that are labeled terminal and those that are not.” Tom 
Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs 122 (Routledge 2006) (quoting About Us, Not Dead 
Yet (Nov. 30, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20061130080647/http://www.notdeadyet.org/docs/
about.html).
13. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights 
Movement (2009); Kathy L. Cerminara, Critical Essay: Musings on the Need to Convince Some People 
with Disabilities that End-of-Life Decision-Making Advocates Are Not Out to Get Them, 37 Loy. U. Chi. 
L.J. 343 (2006); Lois Shepherd, In Respect of People Living in a Permanent Vegetative State—And Allowing 
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in a decade of research about why the two groups appear to remain mired in a 
permanent conflict that prevents constructive work on achieving the shared goal of 
ensuring respect for all persons at the end of life. I will explain why seemingly strong 
claims by advocates for choice in dying that procedural rules and precise definitions 
(such as those used in Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act)14 protect against 
discriminatory applications of laws allowing choice in dying nonetheless fail to 
reassure disability activists who worry that the laws will be used to kill people with 
disabilities against their will. The short answer: disability activists have good reason 
to distrust the health care system in the United States, and until the system is 
perceived as more fair and trustworthy they will continue to find inadequate the 
argument that procedures safeguard against abuse. To the extent advocates for choice 
in dying want to defuse the tension that marks interactions with disability-rights 
activists, they must begin to understand and address the marginalizing, stigmatizing, 
and discriminatory aspects of the health care system experienced by people with 
disabilities throughout their lives. That understanding will go a long way toward 
facilitating better and more effective communication between the groups.
 Part II of this essay explains how I became involved in the dispute over disability 
rights at the end of life, and why I believe that understanding the broader context of 
life with disability helps to explain the deep conflict between advocates for choice in 
dying and advocates for disability rights. Part III explores the experience of people 
with disabilities in the U.S. health care system, including the troubling disparities in 
care. Finally, Part IV suggests that by better attending to the systemic disparities 
faced by people with disabilities in the health care system, advocates for choice in 
dying might begin to break through the distrust and anger that characterize 
disability-rights activists’ protests of discussions about choice in dying. Building trust 
with members of the disability-rights community is, in my view, an important 
element of promoting strong doctor-patient relationships, sound medical policy, and, 
most importantly, increased access to physician aid in dying.15 When trust in 
physicians and policies that affect the lives of persons with disabilities is eroded, the 
Them to Die, 16 Health Matrix 631 (2006); Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo and the Disability Rights 
Community: A Cause for Concern, 2006 U. Chi. Legal F. 253.
14. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800–897 (West 2013); Washington 
Death with Dignity Act, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.245.010–904 (West 2013); see also Or. 
Health Auth., Death with Dignity Act Requirements, available at http://public.health.oregon.
gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/requirements.
pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (explaining that under Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, a request for 
lethal medications can be granted only when the patient is an adult (eighteen years of age or older); is a 
resident of Oregon; is capable (defined as able to make and communicate health care decisions); is 
diagnosed with a terminal illness that will lead to death within six months; has made two oral requests 
of his or her physician separated by at least fifteen days; has provided a written request to his or her 
physician, signed in the presence of two witnesses; and the prescribing physician and a consulting 
physician have confirmed the diagnosis and prognosis, and determined that the patient is capable).
15. I present this argument in more depth in my book, Bioethics and Disability: Toward a Disability-
Conscious Bioethics (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
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prospects for collaboration and consensus around expanded options for all people at 
the end of life remain poor.
II. AN ACCIDENTAL INTERLOPER
 My interest in the disability-rights community began after I wrote a law review 
article16 that discussed the case of Sheila Pouliot.17 I became involved in the Pouliot case 
when I was an assistant solicitor general in the Office of the New York Attorney 
General. My office represented a state agency that sought to enjoin Pouliot’s family and 
doctors from discontinuing the medical provision of nutrition and hydration that was 
sustaining her life.18 Pouliot was an adult with profound cognitive and physical 
disabilities. At the time, she was terminally ill and unable to digest any food or water 
administered orally.19 Pouliot was also being kept alive through intravenous 
administration of fluids.20 When her case went to court, New York state law did not 
allow family members or doctors to withhold nutrition or hydration from a person who 
never had the capacity to make her own decisions.21 Pouliot’s family and doctors 
contested the application of New York law, arguing that they should have the right to 
terminate Pouliot’s treatment because, although the intravenous fluids were keeping her 
alive, they were also causing her intractable pain, bloating, and the deterioration of her 
organs.22 The family was ultimately unsuccessful.23 As a result, Pouliot’s death was 
agonizingly slow and painful, stretching over the course of months.24 My article was a 
criticism of New York’s end-of-life laws, which kept people like Sheila Pouliot alive no 
matter the cost.25 I argued specifically that New York law was especially harmful to 
people with cognitive disabilities because it deprived them of the right to palliative care, 
and exposed them to the risk of the horrific death experienced by Pouliot.26 In my view, 
the law’s barrier to medically appropriate comfort care—including cessation of the 
provision of medically administered nutrition and hydration—was a form of disability 
16. See Alicia R. Ouellette, When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and Torture of 
Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 Ind. L.J. 1 (2004).
17. Blouin ex rel. Estate of Pouliot v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348 (2d Cir. 2004).
18. See id. at 352–53.
19. See id. at 352.
20. See id. at 348, 353–54.
21. See id. at 351.
22. See id. at 355 & n.4.
23. See id. at 365 (holding that the decision to discontinue medical treatment must be grounded clearly in 
the patient’s expressed intent—“not the desires of surrogates or family members”—and that the state 
was within its authority to order the continuation of treatment for as long as possible).
24. See id. at 351–52.
25. See Ouellette, supra note 16, at 21–22.
26. See id. at 23–24, 38. 
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discrimination.27 In short, I thought that by advocating for expanded choices for 
persons with disabilities at the end of life, I had written a pro-disability article.
 I soon learned that some disability-rights activists disagreed. I was surprised (and 
upset) to receive angry emails from disability-rights activists, and even angrier responses 
in person after I presented the paper at conferences and public talks. The charge was 
that, by advocating for a change in New York law to allow for the discontinuation of 
medically administered nutrition and hydration in cases involving persons with 
cognitive disabilities, I was promoting a new form of eugenics and the discriminatory 
notion that lives with disability are not worth living. Eventually, I became something 
of a target for disability-rights activists, who appear to take particular issue with my 
work and participation in discussions that touch on end-of-life issues.28
 The responses from disability-rights activists to my work, and that of other 
advocates for choice in dying in cases involving the removal of life-sustaining 
27. See id. at 22–25. 
28. See Drake, supra note 2. The Not Dead Yet website states:
 Another prominent participant in this event is Alicia Ouellette. If you check out 
the link, her publications and presentations show she had developed an aggressive 
“interest” in disability and “end of life”—the latter a term she uses frequently without 
ever really defining. I first noticed Ouellette when she seemed to show precognitive 
ability when she wrote an entry on the bioethics blog titled “Important End-of-Life 
Case in Massachusetts Reaches Critical Point.” The entry was about Haleigh Poutre, 
an abused 11-year-old girl who was beaten so badly she went into a deep coma. At the 
time of Ouellette’s blog entry, the MA Supreme Court hadn’t rendered a verdict to the 
challenge of treatment removal on the part of her adoptive stepfather, who no doubt 
sought to beat a murder rap. Nevertheless, her situation was referred to as an “end of 
life” case by Ouellette. And Ouellette didn’t find it worth revisiting the subject two 
months later—after the judge had sanctioned Haleigh’s right to die a “dignified” death, 
she began to come out of the coma and is alert and doing well at last report.
 Writing in the Oregon Law Review in 2006, Ouellette wrote out her analysis on 
“Disability and the End of Life.” In the paper, she accuses activists of conf lating 
disability and terminal illness. Leaving a debunking of this aside, I think it’s worth 
noting that neither Ouellette nor other mainstream bioethicists have attacked the Final 
Exit Network or Compassion & Choices for their very blatant—and successful—
maneuvers to conflate terminal illness and disability (and voluntary vs. involuntary, for 
that matter). This article is a goldmine of ad hominem attacks and selective storytelling. 
She makes sure to tie disability activists to religious political groups in relation to 
Schiavo, but also fails to mention the twenty or so national disability groups that 
expressed concerns over Schiavo’s situation and what it meant about dismantled 
protections for people under guardianship. She “tells the story” of Elizabeth Bouvia, 
but without relating the personal events in her life that might have led any young 
woman into a downward slump. She talks brief ly about Larry McAfee but fails to 
credit disability advocates as the ones who got him what he wanted in order to live—a 
place to live outside of an institution. (CORRECTION: I have reread the article in 
question and Ouellette does indeed relate several personal losses and setbacks in 
Bouvia’s life cited by disability activists. Later, though, she apparently gives them short 
shrift by referring to the “power of choice”—implying giving Bouvia an opportunity to 
die with medical assistance empowered her to live.)
 Drake, supra note 10.
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treatment and physician aid in dying,29 persuaded me to learn more about the 
experiences of people with disabilities in and out of the health care system. Thus 
began a decade-long immersion in disability studies and activism that left me with 
many new friends and colleagues, as well as a much deeper understanding of the 
history and experiences that have convinced some disability-rights activists that laws 
that allow for choice in dying will necessarily work against people with disabilities—
no matter how narrowly or carefully drafted they are.
 I also came to understand that where some people perceive both choice in dying 
and access to choice in dying as options that respect individual autonomy, others 
perceive discrimination based on disability status. This position is not, as is sometimes 
claimed, an idea planted by right-wing, right-to-life groups, but rather one based on 
a real concern that the health care system does not value life with disability and 
would, if possible, simply eliminate people with disabilities.30 This view was evident 
in the Terry Schiavo case, about which influential disability scholar Harriet McBryde 
Johnson wrote:
The State of Florida would not have authorized a man to have his non-
disabled wife deprived of food and hydration, and would not have caused her 
death that way. It was because of her disability that her death was thought to 
be appropriate.31
29. See, e.g., Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 
U.S. 243 (2006) (No. 04-623); Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, 
Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2005) (No. SC04-925); Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-35587); Brief 
for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 
(Cal. 2001) (No. S087265).
30. See Adrienne Asch, Disability, Bioethics, and Human Rights, in Handbook of Disability Studies 297, 
301 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001) (“[T]he first right of people with disabilities is a claim to life 
itself, along with the social recognition of the value and validity of the life of someone with a disability.”); 
see also The Case Against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care (Kathleen 
Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002); AMA Code of Med. Ethics, Opinion 2.211—Physician 
Assisted Suicide (June 1996), available at http://ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page (“[A]llowing physicians to participate in assisted suicide 
would cause more harm than good. Physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the 
physician’s role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal 
risks.”); AMA Code of Med. Ethics, Opinion 2.21—Euthanasia (June 1996), available at http://
ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page 
(“Euthanasia could also readily be extended to incompetent patients and other vulnerable populations.”).
31. Harriet McBryde Johnson: Civil Rights Activist, Ability Mag., available at http://abilitymagazine.com/
harriet_mcbryde.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2013); see also Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Guardianship of 
Schiavo), 916 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Harriet Johnson, Not Dead at All: Why Congress Was 
Right to Stick Up for Terri Schiavo, Slate (Mar. 23, 2005, 7:50 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/hey_wait_a_minute/2005/03/not_dead_at_all.html, reprinted in Harriet McBryde 
Johnson, Overlooked in the Shadows, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 2005, at A19, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64571-2005Mar24.html. Of course, not all disability-rights 
advocates oppose choice in dying. See, e.g., Paul K. Longmore, The Disability Rights Opposition to Assisted 
Suicide Explained and Critiqued, in End-of-Life Issues and Persons with Disabilities 144, 151 
(Timothy Lillie & James L. Werth eds., 2007); Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide, 
and Social Prejudice, in Why I Burned My Book and Other Essays on Disability 149 (2003); see 
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Additionally, the claim that laws facilitating choice in dying are a form of disability 
discrimination is evident in the positions taken by the group that protested the 
symposium at New York Law School.
 After a decade of engaging in disability scholarship and listening to people with 
disabilities, I believe it is a mistake to dismiss the positions taken by disability 
advocates as fringe or radical. Underlying these positions is a deep-seated distrust of 
the U.S. health care system that results from historical and pervasive disparities in 
treatment experienced by persons with disabilities. By understanding and addressing 
the source of that distrust and the disparities that plague the system, advocates for 
choice in dying might be able to break through the conflict to foster constructive 
collaborative action.
III. EXPERIENCING DISABILITY IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
 In May 2012, a mainstream disability-rights organization called the National 
Disability Rights Network published a report detailing the ways in which the U.S. 
health care system fails to recognize the value of life with disability.32 The report 
describes conversations between doctors and persons with disabilities and their 
families in which the disabled are “viewed as having little value as they are,” and are 
not considered “fully human, [and therefore not] endowed with inalienable rights of 
liberty, privacy and the right to be left alone—solely because they were born with a 
disability.”33 The National Disability Rights Network is hardly the first group or 
individual to criticize the U.S. health care system for its treatment of persons with 
disabilities; such criticisms are widespread in disability scholarship.34
 Outside of the disability community, the notion that the U.S. health care system is 
an inhospitable place for people with disabilities might be surprising. This is, after all, 
also Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death While Affirming Life: Can End of Life Reform Uphold a Disabled 
Person’s Interest in Continued Life?, in Improving End of Life Care: Why Has It Been So Difficult? 
S31 (Bruce Jennings et al. eds., 2005).
32. See David Carlson, Cindy Smith & Nachama Wilker, Devaluing People with Disabilities: 
Medical Procedures That Violate Civil Rights (2012), available at http://disabilitylawva.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Devaluing_People_with_Disabilities.pdf.
33. Id. at 5.
34. See, e.g., Harlan Lane, The Mask of Benevolence: Disabling the Deaf Community 212–13 
(1992) (discussing the mistreatment of deaf patients in France); Paul K. Longmore, Medical Decision 
Making and People with Disabilities: A Clash of Cultures, in Why I Burned My Book and Other Essays 
on Disability, supra note 31, at 204–11 (describing conflicts between disabled persons and their health 
care providers); Robert Whitaker, Mad in America: Bad Science, Bad Medicine, and the 
Enduring Mistreatment of the Mentally Ill 71–72 (Basic Books 2010); Stephen Drake, The 
Doctor Said It Would Be Better if I Didn’t Survive, Not Dead Yet (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.
notdeadyet.org/2012/03/stephens_story.html; Diane Coleman & Stephen Drake, Disability 
Discrimination, Hastings Ctr. Bioethics F. (July 11, 2012), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/
Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=5913&blogid=140; Ford Vox, ‘The Cyclops Child’: Inhumanity in a 1960 
Hospital, The Atlantic (July 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/07/the-
cyclops-child-inhumanity-in-a-1960-hospital/259810/ (recounting Dr. Fredric Neuman’s cruel treatment 
of a child with severe birth defects).
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decades after both the passage of civil rights statutes for persons with disabilities35 and 
the emergence of disability studies as its own field.36 Nonetheless, disability-based 
discrimination persists. For many persons with disabilities, that discrimination is 
especially acute in the health care system. The long history of medical mistreatment 
of—and insensitivity toward—people with disabilities at the hands of the health care 
establishment is well documented by disability and legal scholars.37 This history 
includes institutionalization,38 eugenics,39 forced sterilization,40 and leaving newborns 
with correctable conditions to die.41 While these practices are now disfavored, 
individuals with disabilities continue to face discrimination in its modern form in 
medical offices and hospitals,42 leaving some of these individuals fearful that the health 
35. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
36. See generally Handbook of Disability Studies (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001); The Disability 
Studies Reader (Lennard J. Davis ed., 3d ed. 2010).
37. See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, 
and Buck v. Bell 45 (2008); The New Disability History: American Perspectives (Paul K. 
Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001); William J. Peace, Comfort Care as Denial of Personhood, 42:4 
Hastings Ctr. Rep. 14 (2012); Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a 
New Civil Rights Movement (Broadway Books 1994); Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in Disability, 
Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy 13, 42 
(1998); Carol J. Gill, Becoming Visible: Personal Health Experiences of Women with Disabilities, in Women 
with Physical Disabilities: Achieving and Maintaining Health and Well-Being 5 (Danuta 
M. Krotoski et al. eds., 1996).
38. See Richard K. Scotch, American Disability Policy in the Twentieth Century, in The New Disability 
History, 375, 377–78 (Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001).
39. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Questions existed about the heritability of conditions and 
whether the patients actually had the suspect conditions. For example, research indicates that Carrie 
Buck was not in fact mentally handicapped. See Roberta M. Berry, From Involuntary Sterilization to 
Genetic Enhancement: The Unsettled Legacy of Buck v. Bell, 12 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 
401, 420–21 (1998); Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: Providing 
Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 862, 867 (2004). 
40. See, e.g., Philip R. Reilly, The Surgical Solution: A History of Involuntary Sterilization in 
the United States 30–40 (1991); Silver, supra note 39, at 867.
41. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dep’t 1983). The “Baby Doe” cases were 
explored by a presidential commission, which issued a report in 1983 that would disallow denial of 
surgery to “an otherwise healthy Down Syndrome child whose life is threatened by a surgically 
correctable complication.” Asch, supra note 30, at 303 (quoting President’s Comm’n for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomed. & Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-
Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 6–7 
(1983)). See also Dennis F. Cantrell, Bowen v. American Hospital Association: Federal Regulation Is 
Powerless to Save Baby Doe, 19 Ind. L. Rev. 1199 (1986) (discussing a case in which a boy, born with 
Down syndrome and esophageal obstruction, died because his parents refused to consent to life-saving 
treatment); Armand Matheny Antommaria, “Who Should Survive?: One of the Choices on Our Conscience”: 
Mental Retardation and the History of Contemporary Bioethics, 16 Kennedy Inst. of Ethics J. 205 (2006) 
(discussing a film that “contains a dramatization of the death of an infant with Down syndrome as a 
result of the parents’ decision to not have congenital intestinal obstruction surgically corrected”).
42. See Staring Back: The Disability Experience From the Inside Out (Kenny Fries ed., 1997); 
Kenny Fries, The History of My Shoes and the Evolution of Darwin’s Theory (2007); 
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care system is a dangerous place. Disability-rights scholar and cultural anthropologist 
William Peace explains: “Most people with a disability fear even the most routine 
hospitalization. We do not fear any of the commonplace indignities those without a 
disability worry about when hospitalized. Our fear is primal—will our lives be 
considered devoid of value?”43
 A variety of medical innovations make disability-rights advocates very 
uncomfortable. For example, controversial procedures such as genetic screening and 
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis can be used to prevent people with disabilities 
from even being born.44 There are also growth attenuation procedures for children 
with disabilities that were modeled on the “Ashley X” case.45 Ashley was a six-year-
old girl from Seattle who was given high doses of estrogen in order to stunt her 
growth; she underwent both a hysterectomy and a mastectomy in order to keep her 
small, so that she could be treated at home.46 There are cases in which health 
providers unilaterally decide to withdraw treatment from children and adults with 
disabilities.47 There have been attempts at rationing health care resources based in 
part on disability status, such as in Oregon, where the federal government eventually 
found that the proposed scheme would unlawfully discriminate against people with 
disabilities.48 And there are reports that fertility clinics routinely deny their services 
to people with disabilities.49
Harriet McBryde Johnson, Too Late to Die Young: Nearly True Tales from a Life (2005); 
Peace, supra note 37, at 14.
43. William J. Peace, Disability Discrimination: The Author Responds, Hastings Ctr. Bioethics F. (July 
27, 2012), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=5935&blogid=140 #ixzz22 
VbDNxiW.
44. See Bonnie Steinbeck, Disability Prenatal Testing and Selective Abortion, in Prenatal Testing and 
Disability Rights 108 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000); Deborah Kaplan & Marsha 
Saxton, Disability Community and Identity: Perceptions of Prenatal Screening, Our Bodies Ourselves, 
http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book/companion.asp?id=31&compID=43&page=2 (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2013).
45. See Carlson, Smith & Wilker, supra note 32.
46. See Alicia Ouellette, Growth Attentuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of Disabled Children: Lessons 
from the Ashley X Case, 8 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 207, 211–12 (2008), available at http://www.law.
uh.edu/hjhlp/Issues/Vol_82/Ouellette.pdf.
47. See Ouellette, supra note 15, at 105–08 (describing the case of Emilio Gonzalez, a child with Leigh’s 
disease whose doctors terminated medical care and provided only comfort care, despite the wishes of 
Emilio’s mother).
48. See Dan Brock, Health Care Resource Prioritization and Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, in 
Americans with Disabilities: Implications for Individuals and Institutions 1, 3–4 (Leslie 
Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000); Lisa L. Dahm, Medical Futility and the Texas Medical Futility 
Statute: A Model to Follow or One to Avoid?, 6 Health Law. 25, 28 (2008).
49. See Nat’l Council on Disability, Rocking the Cradle: Ensuring the Rights of Parents with 
Disabilities and Their Children 205 (2012), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2012/
Sep272012/; see also Barbara Faye Waxman, Up Against Eugenics: Disabled Women’s Challenge to Receive 
Reproductive Health Services, 12 Sexuality & Disability 155 (1994).
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 Beyond controversial medical innovations, disability-rights advocates are even 
more troubled by the day-to-day experience of persons with disabilities in the health 
care system. A report published in 2009 by the National Council on Disabilities 
found that people with disabilities experience significant health care disparities and 
barriers to care.50 People with disabilities are more likely to go without needed care; 
they make more preventable emergency room visits and hospitalizations; they 
experience a significantly higher prevalence of secondary conditions; they get less 
preventive care—fewer pelvic exams, fewer pap smears, fewer prostate exams, less 
prenatal care; they are not as likely to be weighed when they go to the doctor; and 
they have poor health outcomes.51 The statistics reveal a disparity similar to the 
disparity that is well recognized with respect to race and health care.52 Researchers 
are just beginning to recognize and document the depth of disability-based disparities 
in health care.53
 Many factors contribute to disability-based disparities in health care, including 
the cost of care.54 In addition, there are also communication barriers,55 architectural 
barriers, problems with accessible medical equipment, and stereotypes about 
disabilities.56 Understanding how these barriers affect the day-to-day experience of 
people with disabilities in the health care setting will help to explain the reluctance 
50. See Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49.
51. See id.; Elizabeth Pendo, Reducing Disparities Through Health Care Reform: Disability and Accessible 
Medical Equipment, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 1057, 1059–60; Karen Hwang et al., Access and Coordination of 
Health Care Service for People with Disabilities, 20 J. Disability Pol’y Stud. 28, 29–30 (2009) (collecting 
results of population-based surveys); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Surgeon 
General’s Call to Action to Improve the Health and Wellness of Persons with 
Disabilities (2005), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/calls/disabilities/calltoaction.
pdf; Ctr. for Research on Women with Disabilities, Health Disparities Between Women with Physical 
Disabilities and Women in the General Population, Baylor C. Med. (May 2005), https://www.bcm.edu/
research/centers/research-on-women-with-disabilities/?PMID=1331 (discussing the first national 
survey of women with disabilities on their experiences with women’s health care conducted in the years 
immediately following the passage of the ADA).
52. See Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Health Care (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?isbn=030908265X.
53. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Access to Medical 
Care for Individuals with Mobility Disabilities 8–19 (2010), available at http://www.ada.gov/
medcare_mobility_ta/medcare_ta.pdf.
54. See generally Kirsten L. Kirschner, Mary Lou Breslin & Lisa I. Iezzoni, Structural Impairments that 
Limit Access to Health Care for Patients with Disabilities, 297:10 JAMA 1121 (2007).
55. See Michael A. Schwartz, Deaf Patients, Doctors, and the Law: Compelling a Conversation About 
Communication, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 947 (2008) (describing the difficulties experienced by deaf 
patients who are not provided sign language interpreters by their doctors).
56. See Elizabeth Pendo, Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA to Provide 
Meaningful Access, 2 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 15, 17–18 (2008) (describing barriers posed by 
inaccessible buildings and medical equipment); Elizabeth Pendo, Shifting the Conversation: Disability, 
Disparities and Health Care Reform, 6 Fla. Int’l U. L. Rev. 87, 92 (2010) (noting that “twenty years 
after passage of the [ADA], many people with mobility impairments cannot get on examination tables 
and chairs, cannot be weighed, and cannot use x-ray and other imaging equipment”).
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of some disability advocates to trust the system to prevent the abuse of choice-in-
dying laws at the end of life.
 Consider, for example, “equipment barriers.” Medical equipment—examination 
tables, weight scales, x-ray and mammography equipment—is often not accessible to 
people with mobility disabilities.57 Mammography equipment, for instance, is 
designed so that women must stand up to position their breasts in the machine for 
scanning.58 As a result, women with mobility disabilities cannot get screening 
mammograms, except when they happen to have access to an adjustable machine.59 
Consequently, the data shows that women with mobility disabilities are being 
diagnosed with breast cancer at a more advanced stage than people who can stand up 
and make use of the more common inaccessible screeners.60 Similarly, women with 
mobility disabilities face equipment-based challenges getting pap smears; because 
the tables are not accessible, they are not screened.61 Imagine the frustration that 
people with mobility disabilities must feel when they are told—more than two 
decades after the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed—that certain 
screening tests are not available because medical equipment remains inaccessible.
 If the problem was only inaccessible medical equipment, the barriers to care for 
people with disabilities would be eminently fixable. Unfortunately, attitudinal barriers 
are also affecting care. People with disabilities face negative stereotypes and 
assumptions about the tragedy and limitations of life with a disability.62 These negative 
57. See June Isaacson Kailes, The Patient’s Perspective on Access to Medical Equipment, in Medical 
Instrumentation: Accessibility and Usability Considerations 3, 6 (Jack M. Winters & Molly 
Follette Story eds., 2007); Pendo, Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA to 
Provide Meaningful Access, supra note 56, at 17–18.
58. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 53, at 17; Pendo, 
Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA to Provide Meaningful Access, supra 
note 56, at 17–18.
59. See Nancy Mele, Jeanne Archer, & Burton D. Pusch, Access to Breast Cancer Screening Services for Women 
with Disabilities, 34 J. Obstetric, Gynecological & Neonatal Nursing 4, 453–64 (2005), available 
at http://www.memphis.edu/nursing/Suha/Mele.pdf; see also Women with Disabilities and Breast Cancer: 
Know Your Rights, Indep. Care Sys., http://www.icsny.org/sitemanagement/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/
Beast-Cancer-Flyer_FINAL.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
60. See Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49, at 57–58; Ellen P. McCarthy et al., Disparities in 
Breast Cancer Treatment and Survival for Women with Disabilities, 145 Annals Internal Med. 637 
(2006).
61. The problem of inaccessible medical equipment has not gone unnoticed by lawmakers. Because the 
ADA did not solve the problem as intended, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a 2010 guidance 
document about accessibility to health care that mentioned equipment. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 53, at 8–19. In 2012, the DOJ issued a notice of 
proposed rulemaking “to ensure that medical diagnostic equipment, including examination tables, 
examination chairs, weight scales, mammography equipment, and other imaging equipment used by 
healthcare providers for diagnostic purposes are accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 
Medical Diagnostic Equipment Accessibility Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 6916, 6917 (proposed Feb. 9, 
2012) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1195).
62. See Pendo, Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA to Provide Meaning ful 
Access, supra note 56, at 44, 55.
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assumptions affect their health care in ways that are far more intractable than 
inaccessible examination tables. Descriptions of dehumanizing experiences in health 
care settings are all too frequent in disability scholarship.63 People with mobility 
disabilities describe their experiences in doctors’ offices as dehumanizing. Despite 
their interest in living full lives, having children, and enjoying sexual relationships, 
people with disabilities report that providers focus so intently on their impairment 
that they disregard the possibility that their patients have more global needs.64 Women 
with mobility disabilities report that they must be trailblazers in order to get the kind 
of reproductive health care that they want. As scholar Carol Gill explains:
[W]omen with disabilities are stripped of our roles. We are not expected to 
be workers, romantic partners, caregivers, or mothers. Socially, we are in 
limbo—not quite children, but not adults; not men, but not real women 
either. It is difficult to get your bearings and struggle out from under that 
kind of unremitting yet subtle oppression, because it steals from you the very 
sense of self you need in order to fight.65
 Disability scholarship also demonstrates that doctors consistently underestimate 
the quality of life one can have with disabilities.66 When asked to evaluate the quality 
of life of disabled patients, doctors are significantly more negative than the individuals 
who live with impairment; they make negative assumptions about the possible quality 
of life with disability that are simply inaccurate.67 This misperception about how 
people experience their own lives plays out in painful ways. William Peace offers an 
example. Peace is well published,68 writing a powerful blog advocating for social 
justice for persons with disabilities.69 He kayaks, skis, and drives. He also uses a 
wheelchair to get around. One day, Peace’s middle school-aged son lacerated his arm, 
and Peace brought him to the emergency room to get stitches. Although Peace was 
sitting next to his son when the health provider came in, the provider looked right 
past him to the young boy and asked who should be called about the boy’s medical 
63. See, e.g., Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49; Fries, supra note 42, at 1–2; McBryde Johnson, 
supra note 42, at 1; Kailes, supra note 57, at 5; Waxman, supra note 49, at 155–56, 159, 165; Staring 
Back: The Disability Experience from the Inside Out, supra note 42, at 2, 4.
64. See Gill, supra note 37, at 6; see also Waxman, supra note 49.
65. Gill, supra note 37, at 6.
66. See G.L. Albrecht & P.J. Deulieger, The Disability Paradox: High Quality of Life Against All Odds, 48:8 
Soc. Sci. & Med. 977 (1999); J.R. Bach & M.C. Tilton, Life Satisfaction and Well-Being Measures in 
Ventilator Assisted Individuals with Traumatic Tetraplegia, 75:6 Arch. Phys. Med. Rehabilitation 626 
(1994); S. Saigal et. al., Self-Perceived Health Status and Health Related Quality of Life of Extremely Low-
Birth-Weight Infants at Adolescence, 276:6 JAMA 453 (1996).
67. See Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49, at 57, 304; Kailes, supra note 57, at 5; Albrecht & 
Deulieger, supra note 66; Bach & Tilton, supra note 66; Saigal et. al., supra note 66.
68. See, e.g., Peace, supra notes 37, 43.
69. William J. Peace, Bad Cripple, http://badcripple.blogspot.com/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
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care. The provider did not even consider the possibility that the man in the wheelchair 
might have been a parent, which left Peace feeling less than fully human.70
 The kind of dismissive attitude experienced by Peace in that emergency room is 
representative of the day-to-day experiences in the health care setting reported by 
people with disabilities. Individuals cannot get on examination tables for necessary 
exams and cannot be weighed.71 They have to convince surprised doctors that they 
need reproductive health care because they are sexually active.72 They have to go to 
court to enforce their right to a sign language interpreter for communication with 
doctors.73 These situations illustrate a pattern of barriers that leaves some people with 
disabilities feeling marginalized, stigmatized, and viewed as tragically flawed. Such 
experiences erode their trust in the health care system, and such eroded trust affects 
discussions about choice in dying.
IV.  UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT OF LIFE WITH DISABILITY TO ADVANCE 
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE
 Advocates for choice-in-dying laws often counter the concern that such laws will 
be abused to kill persons with disabilities with assurances that procedural safeguards 
will prevent this type of abuse.74 For example, choice-in-dying advocates ask people 
to trust that the procedures that limit access to physician aid in dying (e.g., firm 
diagnosis of terminal condition, confirmed assessment by multiple providers, etc.),75 
will ensure that no one would be forced to accept unwanted aid in dying. Procedural 
rules are carefully designed and enshrined in law so that aid-in-dying laws are not 
used to eliminate vulnerable populations (including people with disabilities)76 who 
have not met the diagnostic criteria or made a clear, unequivocal choice to control 
the time and manner of death.77 It thus seems reasonable to reassure disability 
advocates that physician aid-in-dying laws are not targeted at them. In Oregon, for 
example, aid in dying is available for only competent, terminally ill adults who have 
a confirmed diagnosis of less than six months to live and have made multiple requests 
(including a witnessed written request) for the lethal prescription.78
70. I relate this story in my book. See Ouellette, supra note 15, at 200.
71. See Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49.
72. See id. at 59.
73. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 55, at 981.
74. See Margaret Battin, Physician-Assisted Dying and the Slippery Slope: The Challenge of Empiricil Evidence, 
45 Willamette L. Rev. 91, 99 (2008). Choice-in-dying advocates also point to statistics demonstrating 
the effectiveness of the safeguards. See Anne Marie Su, Note, Physician Assisted Suicide: Debunking the 
Myths Surrounding the Elderly, Poor, and Disabled, 10 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 145, 157 (2013).
75. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.897 (West 2013).
76. See id. § 127.805(2).
77. See id. § 127.897.
78. See id.
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 Such assurances provide little comfort in the context of an untrustworthy health 
care system. As discussed above, assurances of screening tests and preventive care in 
the current system have not been realized for people with mobility disabilities. 
Assurances of equal access to care have not been met for disabled women seeking 
reproductive health care. Assurances of respect for individuals have not been met by 
providers who dismiss the notion that a disabled person can be a parent. The breach 
of trust experienced at other points in the health care system affects conversations 
about end-of-life decisionmaking.
 Conversations initiated in this context, especially conversations about terminating 
treatment or facilitating death, can raise primal fears in patients with disabilities.79 
Persons with disabilities and their allies may question whether conversations about 
terminating treatment mean that the doctor thinks that a disabled life is no longer 
worth living. These individuals may wonder whether a conversation is really about a 
current condition or whether it is based on the same misassumptions that led other 
providers to believe that the person with a disability could not be a parent or was not 
worthy of screening tests.80 The larger context of a lifetime of experience in the medical 
setting helps to explain the skeptical response of people with disabilities to well-
meaning discussions about choices for death. Discussions that look perfectly reasonable 
and non-threatening to advocates for choice in dying can feel very threatening to 
someone who comes from a context in which the system cannot be trusted.
 For this reason, advocates for choice in dying might better serve their cause by 
listening to—and learning from—people with disabilities about their experiences in 
the health care system, and then advocating for systemic change. In order to break the 
impasse between advocates for choice in dying and disability advocates (an impasse 
that has played a role in stalling the adoption of choice-in-dying laws around the 
country), advocates for choice in dying would be well served by working to reshape 
the legal and health care system more broadly to ensure that it respects people with 
disabilities while they are living. Committing to a system that respects people of all 
abilities throughout their lives will help those of us who are committed to building a 
system that respects all of our choices at the time of our deaths. Part of this task 
involves questioning assumptions about the quality of life experienced by people with 
disabilities—and making changes to the way we discuss disability-related cases.
 For example, consider the classic California case Bouvia v. Superior Court,81 
which is included in most textbooks on bioethics, health law, and end-of-life issues. 
It is the seminal case used to teach the principle that individuals have the right to 
refuse treatment—even life-saving, medically administered nutrition and hydration. 
Bouvia involved a twenty-eight-year-old woman who had cerebral palsy and arthritis, 
was in a wheelchair and incontinent, and used a nasogastric (NG) tube for feeding.82 
During a hospitalization, she requested that the NG tube be removed and that she 
79. See Peace, supra note 43.
80. See id.
81. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
82. See id. at 297, 299–300.
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be provided comfort care by the hospital while death from starvation occurred.83 The 
case went to court and she was granted that right.84 The court rejected the argument 
that withdrawing treatment was a form of suicide.85 Finding Bouvia competent and 
that tube-feeding was a form of medical treatment, the court emphasized the 
importance of the right to self-determination:
Elizabeth Bouvia’s decision to forego medical treatment or life-support 
through a mechanical means belongs to her. It is not a medical decision for 
her physicians to make. Neither is it a legal question whose soundness is to be 
resolved by lawyers or judges. It is not a conditional right subject to approval 
by ethics committees or courts of law. It is a moral and philosophical decision 
that, being a competent adult, is hers alone.86
 After detailing the physical elements of Bouvia’s disability, the court further 
explained that it would be “monstrous” to extend her life.87 The court also explained 
that Bouvia’s decision that her life had no meaning was reasonable: “Her mind and 
spirit may be free to take great f lights but she herself is imprisoned, and must lie 
physically helpless subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and 
dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness.”88 Thus, the judge asserted that 
disability had ruined Bouvia’s life: “Such life has been physically destroyed and its 
quality, dignity and purpose [are] gone.”89
83. See id.
84. See id. at 307. Elizabeth Bouvia chose not to end her life after the court granted her wish to die. She 
explained her decision during a 60 Minutes segment broadcast on September 7, 1997:
Mike Wallace: (voiceover) After several attempt[s] at starvation, Elizabeth told us, it 
just became physically too difficult to do. She didn’t want to die a slow, agonizing 
death, nor to do it in the spotlight of public scrutiny. And she told us, with great regret, 
she quietly chose to live.
Ms. Bouvia: Starvation is not an easy way to go.
Wallace: Oh, no.
Ms. Bouvia: You can’t just keep doing it and keep doing it. It really messes up your 
body. And my body was already messed up.
 Jerry Menikoff, Law and Bioethics: An Introduction 262 (Geo. Univ. Press 2001).
85. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305–06.
86. Id. at 305.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Such language is not infrequent in legal cases. In a 1996 decision that supported physician-assisted 
suicide, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit portrayed life with disabilities as hopeless by 
referring to people with physical impairments as existing in “a childlike state of helplessness” exemplified 
by physical immobility or by their use of diapers to deal with incontinence. Compassion in Dying v. 
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997); see also State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 651 (Ga. 1989) (describing the plaintiff, a ventilator-
dependent man who had been needlessly housed in a hospital intensive care unit for months as being 
“incapable of spontaneous respiration, and . . . dependent upon a ventilator to breathe” and stating that, 
“[a]ccording to the record, there is no hope that Mr. McAfee’s condition will improve with time, nor is 
there any known medical treatment which can improve his condition”).
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 What the judge did not mention was the context of the case.90 Bouvia had been a 
graduate student, and she had been kicked out of school because, according to the 
dean, the school could not handle the difficulty of dealing with a student who had 
her physical conditions.91 On top of that, Bouvia’s husband had left her. She had lost 
her house and had a miscarriage.92 There were many difficult things happening in 
Bouvia’s life that made her life seem hopeless, but none of them were her disability. 
She lived a full and rewarding life with the disability for many years.
 Thus the Bouvia case rests on and perpetuates faulty assumptions about 
disabilities. Disability scholars and activists recognized the faulty assumptions 
behind the case long ago.93 But legal scholars and choice-in-dying activists continue 
to cite the case uncritically for the proposition that individuals have the right to 
refuse life-sustaining care. A discussion of the Bouvia case would be richer if it 
included the context in which Bouvia found herself, instead of implicitly confirming 
the humiliation that attends physical disability. As disability scholars point out, it is 
important to remember that Bouvia did not experience her life as monstrous when 
she was a graduate student who was married and pregnant. Perhaps a recognition of 
the context would give rise to a more broadly focused search for solutions—better 
housing, more social support—as alternatives to medically assisted death.
 Recognizing the context surrounding these cases might also diffuse some of the 
tension between disability activists and choice-in-dying advocates. It was after 
Bouvia that disability scholars and activists started to openly question whether such 
cases were really about autonomy—a principle cherished by the community—or 
about a new eugenics.94 They argued, “[The nondisabled public] readily concludes 
that the disabled person’s wish to die is reasonable because it agrees with their own 
preconception that the primary problem for such individuals is the unbearable 
experience of a permanent disability.  .  . . If permanent disability is the problem, 
death is the solution.”95 These arguments are the direct precursors to the argument 
used in opposition to laws that would expand choice in dying: “[W]hen the 
nondisabled say they want to die, they are labeled as suicidal; if they are disabled, it 
is treated as ‘natural’ or ‘reasonable.’”96
 Continued uncritical reliance on Bouvia as a seminal case perpetuates this line of 
argument. Based on principles of autonomy and self-determination, the judge reached 
the correct decision in Bouvia by recognizing the right of individuals to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment. Yet the assumptions about life with disability on which 
90. See Asch, supra note 30, at 311.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See Stanley S. Herr et al., No Place to Go: Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treatment by Competent Persons with 
Physical Disabilities, 8 Issues L. & Med. 3, 36 (1992).
95. Carol J. Gill, Suicide Intervention for Persons with Disabilities: A Lesson in Inequality, 8 Issues L. & Med. 
37, 39 (1996).
96. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1995).
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the decision rested are f lawed. One step toward changing the legal and medical 
systems to better respect persons with disabilities would be to question such 
assumptions about the tragedy of life with disability. Becoming familiar with the 
teachings of disability experts would go a long way toward broadening our 
understanding of life with disability and its many possibilities. Perhaps it is also time 
to look for a different paradigm case.
 In order to develop the skills and knowledge needed to question (mis)assumptions 
about life with disability that alienate disability activists, it will be necessary to better 
educate medical and legal professionals about disability issues and about the way that 
people with disabilities value their own lives (i.e., develop cultural competencies in 
disability).97 There is also a need to diversify the health care workforce to increase the 
number of physicians with disabilities so that the population of medical providers 
better ref lects the general population, and so that persons with disabilities see 
individuals like themselves as part of the health care system.98 And, while contentious, 
it is likely necessary that advocates for choice in dying will need to work together with 
disability advocates and listen more closely to their concerns about end-of-life cases.
V. CONCLUSION
 End-of-life issues take place in the broad context of people’s lives. Recognizing 
that the lived experience of people with disabilities often includes negative encounters 
and discrimination in the health care system may help to explain why conversations 
about expanding choice-in-dying laws are so difficult for many disability advocates. 
The fierce opposition by disability advocates to laws that would expand choice in 
dying will likely continue so long as such laws depend upon a health care system that 
has not proven itself trustworthy. Developing an inclusive health care system in 
which all participants deeply understand disability-related issues and work together 
against disability discrimination will help engender the trust necessary for a system 
that provides options at the end of life. At minimum, that understanding will help 
make room for constructive conversation by bringing disability advocates to the table. 
By respecting the lives that able-bodied and disabled individuals live, choice-in-
dying advocates will be better able to expand laws that allow for respectful deaths.
97. As disability scholar Lennard Davis notes, “[T]o be ignorant of disability studies is simply to be 
ignorant.” Lennard J. Davis, The Disability Studies Reader, at xii (Routledge 3d ed. 2010).
98. See Alcia R. Ouellette, Patients to Peers: Barriers and Opportunites for Doctors with Disabilities, 13 Nev. 
L.J. 645 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147902.
